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The Money Behind Bayport Laboratories: What kdc/one’s SEC Filings Reveal and their biggest investor, Cornell Capital

Explore historical SEC disclosures linking Bayport Laboratories, HCT, kdc/one and Cornell Capital, including ownership interests and supplier purchases.

Looking upward between financial-district towers; illustrative stock photograph.
Bayport Laboratories appears in kdc/one’s public filings as both an investment and a supplier. That connection raises specific questions about financial incentives, oversight and accountability. Who stands behind Bayport Laboratories? Depends where you look. If you go by Texas Secretary of State you will see numerous documents with numerous documents having different information. You’ll see the true founder, Yaumara Camacho’s husband, Angle Damaso Camacho in most of it either signing off on it or named as owner or agent. You will find BL Holdings (their holding company that has the 66% ownership of Bayport Laboratories) you will also find HCT Packaging in New Jersey which owns 33% of Bayport Laboratories (this occurred after the entire HCT v Gardner legal saga). HCT was acquired by kdc/one also known as Knowlton Development Corporation which makes Bayport part of that tangled mess. You’ll also see information about how their 4601 Interwood Pkwy N building is tied into the equation as Bayport Interwood Holdings LP and Interwood Holdings GP were created I am guessing to hold the facility they own with Chase Bank somewhere involved. But there is way more to the story. The answer deserves more than a list of investment firms. It requires following the documented connections: who held an ownership interest, who bought services, who received fees and who supplied financing. SEC filings provide a starting point. In its 2021 offering documents, the Knowlton group, known as kdc/one, disclosed that its HCT business held a one-third ownership interest in Bayport Laboratories, LLC when purchased. It also reported purchasing formulation and filling services from Bayport. Bayport was therefore connected to the group through both an investment and an active commercial relationship. Source: July 2021 registration statement. (open link)

How Bayport fits into the picture

The historical relationship can be described simply: investors backed the Knowlton group; the group acquired HCT; and HCT disclosed a one-third interest in Bayport. That is a useful outline, although it does not identify every intermediate holding company or establish today’s ownership. This distinction matters. Acquiring HCT did not mean acquiring all of Bayport, but it’s literally on their SEC filing so there is something there. A one-third interest also does not, by itself, establish the right to appoint Bayport’s managers or direct its litigation necessarily but it does not mean they get to avoid responsibility. If you invest $1 into a business that is harassing a former co-worker and the daughter of the co-worker who never worked for you and is a victim of rape and other crimes, then one can easily question your ethics as a investor. My opinion? You don’t care how you get your money. The commercial connection is equally important. Here is what the group reported spending on Bayport’s formulation and filling services:
Reporting period Purchases from Bayport
Fiscal year ended April 30, 2020 $600,000
Fiscal year ended April 30, 2021 $2 million
Three months ended July 31, 2021 $1.9 million
These amounts measure the group’s purchases, not Bayport’s total revenue or profits, those are likely higher. The periods also differ: the 2020 figure includes only the period following the HCT acquisition, and the last figure covers one quarter. Even with those limits, the disclosures establish a substantial purchasing relationship. July filing; September amendment, related-party transactions. But look at how odd it is. in the fiscal year ending in 2020 it’s a perfect rounded figure of 600,000. In 2021, it rose dramatically to 2 Million! But Three months ending in July 2021, 1.9 Million! Do the math because the math aint mathing. That gives the Bayport story a wider business context. An investor has an interest in the value of its investment. A customer has an interest in reliable production. Here, the disclosed relationship involved both.

Which investment firms are connected?

The September 2021 filing’s pre-offering ownership table, on its stated adjusted share basis, identified a Cornell Capital-associated investment vehicle at approximately 59%, CDP Investissements Inc., controlled by CDPQ, a Canadian investment group, at approximately 25%, and Upper Invest Ltd. at “approximately” 10%. These were interests in the parent group, not direct percentages of Bayport. Source: principal-shareholder table and footnotes. That snapshot later changed. A March 2022 announcement reported a significant investment by KKR, said Cornell Capital would remain the largest shareholder, and said existing investors, including CDPQ, would remain invested. Financial terms were not disclosed. The 2021 percentages therefore should not be presented as current ownership. Source: March 2022 investment announcement. The accurate connection is that these institutions backed the broader group whose HCT business disclosed an interest in Bayport. The records reviewed do not establish that each institution directly owned Bayport or controlled its decisions.

Cornell’s disclosed role went beyond supplying capital

An executed 2018 services agreement described Cornell’s role in governance, risk management and strategic planning. It provided an initial $4 million fee, an annual fee equal to 2.5% of contract-defined consolidated adjusted EBITDA, and acquisition fees equal to 1% of enterprise value, plus expense reimbursement. The same agreement limited Cornell’s role as an outside adviser and its authority to bind the company, apart from separate director responsibilities. Both sides of that arrangement matter: there was a paid advisory role. Source: executed services agreement, sections 2–4 and 7. For the Bayport story, this supports a concrete question: if concerns about Bayport reached people responsible for risk management, what review followed? None that I have seen

Why the private-equity financing matters

The group disclosed a $318.5 million return of capital to shareholders on February 3, 2021, funded through cash and additional borrowing. This is a documented example of shareholders receiving money while the business took on additional debt associated with the payout. Source: distribution financing transactions and dividend policy. That is one reason private-equity financing deserves scrutiny. Owners can receive a distribution while the operating business carries continuing repayment obligations. Readers can reasonably ask how those obligations affect spending, investment and business priorities.

Newer filings show lenders still have money at stake

The record extends beyond the 2021 offering documents. Apollo Debt Solutions BDC’s SEC filing for June 30, 2026 listed a kdc/one first-lien term-loan position with $44.592 million in principal, due August 15, 2028. This is one fund’s reported holding, not kdc/one’s total debt and not a direct loan to Bayport. Source: Apollo’s investment schedule, printed page 45. An equity investor and a lender occupy different positions. Equity investors hold ownership interests. Lenders hold repayment claims and may have contractual reporting rights. The 2028 maturity is a financing milestone worth following. It does not establish an impending sale, default, bankruptcy or plan to dispose of Bayport but it doesn’t rule it out.

What does this tell us about the Garcia dispute?

The financial connections identify institutions whose relationship to Bayport deserves careful examination. Ownership, knowledge and decision-making are separate questions but it’s a fact Cornell Capital and it’s other investors have known about this issue and are very aware of the issue. Giselle’s circumstances and Milagros’s circumstances also require their own factual treatment as Giselle speaks for herself. The public accountability questions are straightforward:
  • Who currently holds the disclosed Bayport interest, and what decision-making rights accompany it?
  • Does the purchasing relationship continue, and who manages it?
  • Which people with relevant responsibilities received and reviewed concerns about Bayport?
  • What substantive response, if any, followed that review?
You’d think they would have answered or made a statement. Spoiler: They have refused to respond and have done everything possible to keep their names out of it.

Why it matters

A dispute involving a single business can sit within a much larger network of ownership, purchasing, advisory services and financing. Understanding that network helps the public ask informed questions about where responsibility actually lies. The SEC record gives those questions a factual foundation: a disclosed ownership interest, substantial purchases, a paid sponsor advisory role and identifiable lender exposure. That is the work accountability requires: establish the relationship, establish who knew what, and examine what they did with that knowledge. Reporting note: This article draws on public SEC filings and company announcements reviewed through October 3, 2026. The planned 2021 U.S. IPO was withdrawn for unknown but questionable reasons; the company reported that no securities were sold under that registration statement. SEC filing does not mean SEC endorsement. Read the withdrawal request. Featured image: illustrative financial-district photograph by Marquise Kamanke on Unsplash.

Related coverage: investor connections and notice emails · Bayport testimony on cosmetics, Sephora and Patrick Ta · public court dockets.

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